Paying for Efficiency : Incentivising same-day discharge in the English NHS by Gaughan, James Michael et al.
Paying for Efficiency: Incentivising Same-Day Discharges in the
English NHS
James Gaughan∗1, Nils Gutacker1, Katja Grasˇicˇ1, Noemi Kreif1, Luigi Siciliani2, and
Andrew Street3
1Centre for Health Economics, University of York
2Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York
3Department of Health Policy, The London School of Economics and Political Science
Abstract
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methods, we find that the policy had generally a positive impact with a statistically significant
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1 Introduction
Many healthcare systems reimburse hospitals through prospective payment systems (PPS) in which
the price for a defined unit of activity, such as a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG), is set in advance
and is equal across hospitals (Paris et al. 2010). Economic theory predicts that hospitals will
expand activity in areas where price exceeds marginal costs and minimise activity in areas where
they stand to make a loss.1 This form of reimbursement should encourage hospitals to engage in
efficient care processes and cost reduction strategies to improve profit margins (Shleifer 1985; Ellis
and McGuire 1986; Ma 1994; Hodgkin and McGuire 1994).
One way to reduce costs is by reducing length of stay (LoS), this being an important cost
driver. For some patients it may be possible to reduce overnight stays to zero, specifically those for
whom care can be provided safely2 within a setting in which patients are admitted, treated and
discharged on the same day (‘same day discharge’ (SDD)). Not only may an SDD be less costly to
provide, it might also be beneficial to some patients if they can recover in the comfort of their own
home and are less exposed to potentially infectious hospital environments. Increasing SDDs for
these patients generates a welfare improvement driven by lower provider costs and unaltered or
improved health benefits for patients. The British Association of Day Surgery (BADS) (2006) has
recommended the adoption of SDD for 157 types of planned surgery and the British Association
for Ambulatory Emergency Care (BAAEC) (2014) has identified a range of 34 conditions that
require urgent care but where a subsequent overnight stay for observation is generally considered
unnecessary. Implementing these recommendations is also in the financial interest of hospitals
reimbursed according to the English form of PPS, which pays the same amount for SDD admissions
and for admissions with an overnight hospital stay, despite the cost of providing SDD care being
lower (Street and Maynard 2007).3 Therefore, hospitals can improve profits by increasing the
proportion of patients treated on an SDD basis rather than keeping them in hospital overnight.
Despite these recommendations and financial incentives, SDD rates are lower than is clinically
recommended for a wide range of conditions (Department of Health 2009)(see also Figure 1). The
1 (Semi-)altruistic providers may be willing to treat patients for which marginal costs exceed price as long as the
financial losses are offset by sufficient patient benefit. The extent to which this is possible depends on the potential
for cross-subsidisation within the organisation, and whether they face a soft budget constraint (Brekke et al. 2015).
2 As early as 1985, the Royal College of Surgeons of England (1985) noted that “it should be clear to all concerned,
the surgeon, the nursing staff, and in particular the patient, that day-surgery is in no way inferior to conventional
admission for those procedures for which it is appropriate, indeed it is better.” (Royal College of Surgeons of England
1985).
3 For example, in 2013/14 the average cost of planned surgery carried out as a day case in the English NHS was
£698 compared to the average cost of £3,375 for overnight stays. (https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/blog/2015/07/
day-case-surgery-good-news-story-nhs)
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reasons for these low rates may relate to financial constraints on hospitals that limit their ability
to invest in dedicated same-day facilities or reluctance by doctors to change established working
practices. One way to encourage hospitals and doctors to increase uptake of SDD care is to increase
the SDD price. This has been the approach taken in England under a payment reform known as
the SDD bonus policy (Monitor & NHS England 2014). Hospitals receive an SDD bonus on top of
the base DRG price for treating a patient as an SDD compared to an overnight admission. Starting
in 2010, the reform has been progressively applied to 32 different conditions.
Our analysis of this policy reform makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it
contributes to our understanding of economic incentives in the health sector by exploiting unique
features of the SDD policy that relate to the economic importance of the bonus and the focus on
efficiency (as opposed to other dimensions such as quality or overall volume). It is designed to
incentivise technical efficiency, by paying hospitals extra to reduce length of stay and use of care
inputs, such as staff time and hospital beds, by shifting care delivery from more expensive overnight
wards to less costly same day settings. A distinctive feature of the SDD bonus policy is that the
incentive scheme is high-powered, in that it pays more for the less costly SDD treatment. This
contrasts with the common form of PPS in which prices are set at average cost (Shleifer 1985),
either pooled across SDD and overnight stay (e.g. as in England), or separately for each admission
type (e.g. as in Norway where the price is lower for an SDD than an overnight stay in line with the
different average costs). In England, the cost advantage varies across the 32 conditions from 23%
to 71% lower for SDD than for an overnight hospital stay in the pre-policy period. The SDD bonus
compounds this advantage and is also economically significant, varying from 8% to 66% more than
for an overnight stay. We are able to exploit this heterogeneity in the size of the incentive to assess
whether it predicts changes in behaviour.
We also contribute to analytical studies that employ relatively new synthetic control (SC)
methods and compare these to more traditional difference-in-difference (DID) methods. To evaluate
the effectiveness of the policy we exploit the fact that incentives have been applied to 32 conditions,
using non-incentivised conditions as control groups. SC methods are a potentially useful addition
to the analytical armoury in situations where it is possible to draw on a large number of potential
control groups. Following the pioneering work by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al.
(2010), SC methods are receiving increasing attention in the wider economic literature (Billmeier
and Nannicini 2013; Bharadwaj et al. 2014; Green et al. 2014; Acemoglu et al. 2017). Within health
economics, SC methods have been applied to study the effect of co-payments (Olsen and Melberg
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2018), tax incentives (Fletcher et al. 2015; Bilgel and Galle 2015), public health interventions such
as malaria eradication (Barofsky et al. 2015), and expansion of health insurance (Hu et al. 2018;
Hernæs 2018). SC methods have been very rarely applied to provider incentives. We are only aware
of one study by Kreif et al. (2016), which applies SC methods to evaluate the effect of a regional
pay-for-performance (P4P) scheme in England on mortality rates. These studies all consider a
single policy initiative with associated idiosyncrasies, which provides limited evidence on the general
applicability of SC methods for policy evaluations typically considered in health economics. In
contrast, we evaluate 32 policy variants of a particular payment reform following a common analysis
plan (e.g. sample period, unit of assessment, criteria for selecting suitable control groups, etc.).
This yields insights into whether DID and SC methods generate consistent conclusions in terms of
point estimates and statistical inference under a range of different scenarios.
Our key findings on the effectiveness of the policy are as follows. We find that the policy led to
a statistically significant increase in SDD rates of 5 percentage points (pp) for planned conditions
and 1pp for emergency conditions. However, there is considerable heterogeneity across conditions
with eight out of 13 planned conditions showing statistically significant positive effects in DID
analysis. Estimated effects range from -2 to +22pp changes in SDD rates. Results are more mixed
for emergency conditions, where we find that the policy had a statistically significant positive effect
on six out of 19 emergency conditions but caused reductions in SDD rates for two conditions. The
range of estimated effects is also narrower (-6 to +6pp) and more centred around zero. The median
elasticity of SDD rates to price is 0.24 for planned conditions and 0.01 for emergency conditions
(overall median = 0.09). Elasticities are larger for conditions with larger post-policy price differences
between SDD and overnight care, and, for planned conditions only, with bigger profit margins. In
relation to the methods employed, our analysis suggests that DID and SC methods provide similar
point estimates when there is a large pool of potential control conditions to choose from, as is the
case for planned conditions. However, even in such favourable instances, inference from SC methods
are still considerably more conservative, resulting in fewer statistically significant findings than in
DID analysis.
Our analysis relates to two strands of the literature within the broader area of hospital incentive
schemes (Chandra et al. 2011). First, we contribute to studies that focus on the effect of changes in
prices designed to encourage hospitals to reduce LoS. It is well established that PPS encourages
reductions in LoS compared to either fee-for-service or global budgeting arrangements, by making
hospitals more cost-conscious than the alternative funding regimes. This was examined in pioneering
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work by Rosko and Broyles (1986), Salkever et al. (1986), Long et al. (1987), and Lave and Frank
(1990) and others in the US Medicare and Medicaid systems, and has subsequently been confirmed
in a range of other countries (e.g. Shmueli et al. 2002; Farrar et al. 2009; Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff
2010; O’Reilly et al. 2012). As well as finding general reductions in LoS, Farrar et al. (2009)
estimated that the introduction of PPS in the English NHS led to an 0.4 to 0.8% increase in SDD
rates for planned surgery. Much less is known about the ability of payers to influence LoS through
deliberate price setting within a PPS arrangement. Shin (2019) exploits the 2005 Medicare change
in its definition of payment areas that generated exogenous area-specific price shocks. The study
found that the higher price did not affect volume, LoS and quality of services but it induced shifting
patients into higher-paying DRGs. This is in line with Dafny (2005), who found that a 10% increase
in price due to the removal of an age criterion in the allocation of patients to DRGs led to upcoding
without significant change in LoS. Verzulli et al. (2017) study the effect of a one-time price increase
for a subset of DRGs in the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy. They find evidence that hospitals
expand the provision of surgery in response to more generous reimbursement but this has no effect
on waiting times or LoS. More closely related to our setting, Januleviciute et al. (2016) examine the
choice of SDD care versus overnight stay in the Norwegian context, where prices are differentiated
by admission type. They find no evidence that hospitals respond to intertemporal variation in the
price mark-ups for overnight stays relative to SDD care by changing their discharge practice.
In none of the above-mentioned settings were prices set with the explicit aim to reduce LoS.
A noteworthy exception is the study by Allen et al. (2016), who considered the impact of the
SDD bonus policy in England on a single incentivised condition, cholecystectomy, within a DID
framework with a control group of all non-incentivised procedures recommended for SDD care.
This study found an increase in SDD rates of 5.8 percentage points in the first 12 months following
the policy introduction. As well as comparing DID and SC methods, we extend this earlier analysis
to 31 additional conditions, allowing us to examine the generalisability of the previous result and
study the determinants of the potentially heterogeneous responses to the SDD bonus. Furthermore,
we examine longer-term effects, up to five years after the introduction of the bonus, allowing us to
examine whether short-term effects are maintained over time.
Our study also contributes to a second strand of literature evaluating P4P programmes. A recent
study reviews 34 hospital sector P4P schemes in high-income countries (Milstein and Schreyo¨gg
2016). Most of the P4P schemes reviewed focus on incentivising quality, either through rewarding
health outcomes or process measures of quality, and involve small or moderate bonuses of 5% or less
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(Cashin et al. 2014). Effects are generally modest in size, short-lived and sometimes associated with
unintended consequences. In contrast to the existing P4P literature, the policy we evaluate has
two distinct features. First, few P4P schemes incentivise technical efficiency directly, so this study
contributes to the small literature on what we label “pay-for-efficiency” (P4E) schemes. Second,
the SDD bonus policy is much more high-powered than previous P4P schemes and, therefore, our
analysis can shed light on whether limited responsiveness to P4P schemes as documented in the
literature is simply due to insufficient financial incentive, as has been hypothesised (Milstein and
Schreyo¨gg 2016).
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional background and the SDD
pricing policy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines the empirical methods. Section 5
describes the results. Section 6 is devoted to discussion and concluding remarks.
2 Institutional background and behavioural predictions
The English NHS is funded by general taxation and residents have to be registered with a general
practitioner. There are two routes to hospital: either patients are referred by their general
practitioner for care ‘planned’ in advance (e.g. scheduled surgery) or they are admitted for
immediate ‘emergency’ care after attending the hospital’s emergency department. The SDD bonus
policy applies to both planned and emergency conditions. NHS patients face no charges for hospital
care, whether in publicly owned NHS hospitals or the small number of private hospitals that provide
care to NHS patients. All NHS hospital doctors are salaried and do not share in hospitals’ profits
or losses.
The NHS adopted a PPS for hospital reimbursement in 2003. Hospitals are paid a pre-determined
price for treating NHS-funded patients, differentiated by Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs; the
English equivalent of DRGs). Patients are assigned to a HRG based on diagnoses, procedures and,
in some cases, other characteristics such as age (Department of Health 2002; Grasˇicˇ et al. 2015).
Initially limited to a small number of planned conditions, PPS has been extended progressively
over time and now covers most hospital activity.
Before the SDD policy was introduced, the HRG payment was the same for both same day and
for overnight stays across planned treatments4. This was not the case for emergency care, where
4 Hospitals also receive additional per diem payments for each additional night a patient stays in hospital beyond a
HRG-specific long-stay trim point. This trim point is set at the 75th percentile plus 1.5x the interquartile range of
the LoS distribution in the HRG. Such long-stay adjustments are not relevant to our study since the SDD policy is
directed at the low end of the LoS distribution.
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the payment for same day treatments was lower than for overnight stays (to reduce the incentive to
admit less severe patients for overnight observation).
From 2010, the English Department of Health has gradually introduced explicit incentives in
the form of the SDD bonuses, which give a stronger financial incentive to reduce LoS. For patients
allocated to the same HRG, the policy involved increasing the payment for someone treated on an
SDD basis, with an offsetting reduction in the base HRG price for those who stay overnight. The
difference between these two prices constitutes the SDD bonus. The specific conditions to which
the SDD bonuses apply are drawn from a list compiled by the British Associations of Day Surgery
and for Ambulatory Emergency Care for which overnight stay is considered unnecessary and where
there is clinical consensus about the appropriate level of SDD.5 The BADS and BAAEC both
produce directories listing 191 clinical conditions (i.e. specific diagnoses or surgical treatments)
between them that are deemed suitable for SDD with recommended rates (RRs) of SDD that are
considered safe and appropriate (British Association of Day Surgery 2006; British Association for
Ambulatory Emergency Care 2014).
The SDD bonuses apply to all public and private hospitals providing publicly-funded care. The
selection and design of the bonuses was informed by discussions with clinical stakeholders and
varies across clinical areas (Department of Health 2007). The general criteria for potential selection
are volume (>5,000 patients/year)6, the national SDD rate being below the RR for this condition,
and evidence of variation in the SDD rate across hospitals (Department of Health 2009). Not all
clinical conditions meeting these general criteria have an SDD bonus but by April 2014, 13 planned
and 19 emergency conditions were covered by the incentive scheme (Monitor & NHS England 2014).
To qualify for the bonus payment, the patient has to be admitted and discharged on the same day.
In addition, for planned treatments, the care has to be scheduled as SDD in advance of admission.
New conditions to be incentivised are announced six months in advance of introduction.
Since the introduction of the SDD bonus policy the price for same day discharge is systematically
higher than for overnight stay across the 32 SDD conditions. As an example, in 2010 hospitals were
paid £329 (or 24%) more for cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal) provided as SDD (Department
of Health 2009). The absolute and relative size of the price differential varies considerably across
5 In some cases, additional exclusion criteria are applied to limit the scope of the SDD bonus to non-complex patients.
In these cases, the group of patients with incentivised prices attached is a subset of those given in relevant directories
and recommended rates can be considered a lower bound of what is clinically appropriate.
6 An exception is ‘simple mastectomy’ which has been incentivised since 2011 despite an annual volume of about 4,000
patients.
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the 32 incentivised conditions, ranging from 8% to 66% of the overnight admission price. Once
introduced, bonus differentials are fairly stable over time7.
Table 1 provides an overview of the incentivised SDD conditions, the financial year in which the
incentive was introduced8, the price with and without the SDD incentive, the average cost of care
reported by NHS hospitals in the year prior to the policy, as well as the SDD rate and the number
of patients eligible in the twelve months prior to announcement of the incentive for that condition.
Notice that in the pre-policy period hospitals already had a financial incentive to treat planned
patients as SDD up to the recommended rate given that the cost of SDD is nearly always lower than
the cost of an overnight stay. But as shown below in Section 3, hospitals had very low planned SDD
rates in the pre-policy period, and always well below the RR. This could be due to the motivations
of the doctor providing treatment or the constraining features of the hospital in which the doctor
works, which we discuss in turn.
As regards low motivation, slow uptake of SDD may reflect poor dissemination about best
practice. Doctors may have established practices and be reluctant to engage in disruptive innovations
or simply may not be aware of or doubt the evidence that SDD is as safe as traditional practice
involving overnight admission for the conditions concerned. They may also struggle to identify the
patient population that is suitable for SDD, particularly if it is not recommended for all patients,
i.e. RR < 100%. Greater uptake of SDD may also require some re-training (e.g. in laparoscopic
surgical techniques) that carries monetary and time costs for doctors.
The hospital in which the doctor works may be constrained in its ability to extend SDD to
more patients. To a limited extent, SDD treatments can be offered in a normal hospital setting.
However, scaling-up the provision of SDD treatment requires dedicated physical space and facilities.
The hospital may have to invest in a dedicated facility, either by opening up new buildings or
by engaging in re-organisation of existing wards. This would involve fixed costs which would be
justifiable to senior managers only if it offers the prospect of long-term financial returns. Hospitals
may not undertake this investment, particularly if they face borrowing constraints that restrict
their access to capital funds (Marini et al. 2008; Thompson and McKee 2011). Moreover, managers
faced with the various day-to-day issues of running a hospital may find it difficult to allocate the
necessary time and resources to engage in more strategic re-organisations. Paying a bonus for
7 The bonus as a percentage of base price changed by more than 5% from introduction to the financial year 2014/15
for six out of 32 SDD conditions. This variation arises due to changes to the base price that reflects year-on-year
variation in the reported cost data used for price setting rather than because of purposeful policy refinement.
8 Financial years run from 1st April to 31st March of the following calendar year.
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activity conducted on an SDD basis may be sufficient to overcome both clinical and managerial
resistance.
More formally, denote the pre-policy period with α = 0 and the post-policy period as α = 1. The
price for a HRG (g) in year (k) in the pre-policy period (P0,k,g) is proportional to the average cost
of care reported across all English NHS hospitals for patients (admitted as planned or emergency)
who were treated three years before, C¯k−3,g =
∑J
j=1(Ck−3,j,g × Nk−3,j,g)/
∑J
j=1Nk−3,j,g, where
j = 1 . . . J denotes the hospital, Nk−3,j,g is the number of patients for a given hospital j, and Ck−3,j,g
is the average cost of patients in hospital j9. Prices are further adjusted to account for inflation (I)
and expected general technical efficiency improvement (E) factors10 . Therefore, the pre-policy
price is P0,k,g = C¯k−3,g × Ik × Ek with Ik > 1 and Ek < 1. For most planned treatments, hospitals
are paid the same for patients admitted and discharged on the same day (SDD) or overnight stays
(ON). Therefore, P0,k,g = P
SDD
0,k,g = P
ON
0,k,g if treatment is planned. However, a short-stay adjustment
is applied to patients admitted as an emergency and discharged on the same day. The adjustment
takes the form of a factor 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 which takes the value 1 if the national average length of stay
for the HRG is less or equal to two nights and increasingly smaller values as average length of stay
increases. Therefore, emergency care including at least one overnight stay has a price constructed
equivalently to planned care PON0,k,g = P0,k,g while P
SDD
0,k,g = λP0,k,g.
We compare the financial incentives that hospitals faced before and after the policy. To keep
the presentation simple, we suppress the HRG and year notation (g and k) and also assume that
(i) each hospital has a total volume of patients treated (either as SDD or overnight) equal to N
and that this is constant over time, (ii) each hospital has identical costs, therefore also suppressing
j, but average costs can vary over time before and after the policy (for example as a result of
the change in case-mix arising from a change in the proportion of patients treated as overnight
admission).
In summary, the price pre-policy is P0 and post-policy is P
SDD
1 for same-day discharge and
PON1 for an overnight stay. Hospital incentives are driven not only by differences in prices but also
differences in costs. Define CON0 and C
SDD
0 as respectively the average cost of an overnight stay
and a same-day discharge in the pre-policy period (and CON1 , C
SDD
1 in the post-policy period).
9 All NHS hospitals provide detailed reference cost information to the Department of Health on an annual basis. These
data are collated in the reference cost schedule and provide information on the average cost of production across
hospitals, further broken down by admission type.
10The base price is further adjusted for hospital-specific factors such as local cost of capital and labour and specialist
hospital status. As the policy evaluated is national and applies equally to all hospitals, these hospital-specific
adjustments do not affect the incentives created.
9
The profit function for planned SDD activity, denoted pi, in the pre-policy and the post-policy
period is given respectively by
pi0 = N
SDD
0 (P0 − CSDD0 ) + (N −NSDD0 )(P0 − CON0 ) (1)
pi1 = N
SDD
1 (P
SDD
1 − CSDD1 ) + (N −NSDD1 )(PON1 − CON1 ) (2)
and the difference in profit before and after the policy is:
∆pi = pi1 − pi0 = (PSDD1 − PON1 )NSDD1 −N(P0 − PON1 )
+ (NSDD1 −NSDD0 )(CON0 − CSDD0 )
− [NSDD1 (CSDD1 − CSDD0 ) + (N −NSDD1 )(CON1 − CON0 )]
(3)
Under the assumptions outlined above, the first term is positive and gives the additional revenues
for every treatment which is provided as SDD. The second term is negative and is given by the
reduction in revenues due to a reduction in the overnight price. The third term is positive if the
SDD price induces an increase in the SDD rate, which is less costly (evaluated at pre-policy costs).
The fourth and last term, in square brackets, relates to changes in the average costs, which can be
due to patient composition or external factors, the sign being generally indeterminate. We could
argue, for example, that patients who are treated as SDD after the policy are at the margin more
severe, so that this will translate into an increase in the average cost of SDD and a reduction in the
average cost of an overnight stay (see Siciliani (2006) and Hafsteinsdottir and Siciliani (2010) for
more formal theoretical models). However, we assume that the increase in average costs for SDD is
relatively small, so that an increase in SDD rates leads to a reduction in overall costs (i.e. the sum
of the third and fourth term is positive).
The analysis highlights that the SDD pricing policy generates a financial incentive for hospitals,
equal to PSDD1 − PON1 > PSDD0 − PON0 > 0, to increase planned SDD treatments, but the overall
effect on profits also depends on the reduction in the base price. A similar analysis holds for
emergency care where the only difference is that pre-policy the price was higher for overnight
treatments, i.e. PSDD1 − PON1 > PSDD0 − PON0 < 0.
Differentiating equation 3 with respect to the number of SDD treatments, NSDD1 , we obtain
the financial incentive to treat an additional patient as an SDD. This is given by (PSDD1 − PON1 )−
(CSDD1 −CON1 ), which is always positive whenever the cost of SDD activity is lower than the cost of
10
an overnight admission. The expression suggests that, potentially, hospitals have a strong financial
incentive to increase the number of SDD patients.
3 Data
We use data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) on all NHS-funded patients aged 19 or older
admitted to English hospitals between April 2006 and March 2015 for care which could be delivered
as SDD according to the BADS / BAAEC directories (157 planned and 34 emergency conditions).
HES is an admission-level dataset that contains detailed information on patients’ clinical and
socio-demographic characteristics, the admission pathway and its timings, and whether care was
scheduled as SDD in advance (planned admissions only). A patient is considered to have received
SDD care if admission and discharge date coincide.
Figure 1 shows the SDD rate and the RR for each of the 32 incentivised conditions in the
year 2009, prior to the start of the SDD pricing policy. Observed rates for planned conditions
are highlighted in light grey, and those for emergency conditions in dark grey. There is marked
heterogeneity both in terms of the observed SDD rate and the remaining gap towards the RR, i.e.
the potential for growth.
Observed SDD rates may change over time due to unrelated changes in medical technology
which facilitates SDD treatment for specific subpopulations of patients. To account for this, we
apply an indirect standardisation approach to calculate risk-adjusted quarterly rates of SDD for
each hospital and condition in our dataset, holding the relationship between patient characteristics
and the probability of SDD constant over time. We construct a set of risk-adjustment variables from
HES including patient age (coded as a categorical variable in 10-year bands with separate categories
for 19-24 and >85), gender (male = 1), number of Elixhauser comorbidities (coded as 0, 1, 2-3, 4-6
and 7+) (Elixhauser et al. 1998) and whether the patient had any past emergency admissions within
365 days (yes = 1). As a measure of socio-economic status, we use the income deprivation score of
the English Indices of Deprivation 2010 for the patients’ local area of residence11 (McLennan et al.
2011). We estimate the relationship between the vector of observed patient characteristics Xi and
the probability of SDD for all patients i = 1, . . . , N treated in the financial year 2006 using the
11Defined as the lower layer super output area (LSOA), with an average population of approximately 1,500 individuals.
11
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logit model12
Pr[Yi = 1 |Xi] = exp(α+Xi
′θ)
1− exp(α+Xi′θ) (4)
where Yi is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if the patient was admitted and
discharged on the same calendar day. As our primary concern is changes in the risk relationship
over time that are common to all hospitals, we do not include hospital fixed effects in this equation.
The predicted probabilities Yˆijt for patients i in hospital j in quarter t are then used to derive the
risk-adjusted hospital-quarter rate
Yˆjt =
∑Njt
i=1 Yijt∑Njt
i=1 Yˆijt
× Y¯2006Q2 (5)
Equations 4 and 5 are estimated separately for each of the 191 conditions in our sample. Note
that, as long as the same case-mix adjustment model is used for all periods, our choice of Quarter
2 (April-June) 2006 as the base quarter is arbitrary. Further, since the prediction model for Yˆjt
is based on large numbers of patients, we can safely ignore sampling uncertainty in parameter
estimates used to adjust for case-mix differences.
Hospitals are consulted on any changes to the payment system — including the introduction of
SDD bonuses applied to other conditions — approximately six months prior to the change. This
gives them time to adapt to the new policy before the actual implementation, which may bias
observed pre-policy rates. We therefore exclude data for the six months prior to the condition being
incentivised. For some conditions eligibility criteria were refined over time to restrict the incentive
to a more tightly defined patient population in which case we apply the criteria that were valid
when the financial incentive first applied to ensure consistency throughout the study period.
The overall sample includes 11,336,138 patients with incentivised conditions and 21,121,500
patients with non-incentivised conditions. Descriptive statistics for case-mix variables by incentivised
condition are available in Table A1 in the Appendix. Each hospital is observed for up to 34 quarters
per condition. The number of hospital-quarter observations varies across the incentivised conditions
and ranges from 3,022 (#5 Endoscopic prostate resection) to 9,245 (#7 Hernia repair).
12We use a logit regression model to avoid predicting outside the probability range of 0 to 1. This is less of an issue
when drawing inference about DID regression coefficients as described in section 4.1.
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4 Methods
Our empirical analysis seeks to estimate the causal effect of the SDD bonus policy on the probability
that a patient admitted with an incentivised condition is discharged on the same day as admission13.
We perform separate analyses for each of the 32 incentivised conditions. For each incentivised
condition, we estimate DID and SC models, both of which aim to control for common exogenous
shocks and underlying time trends by means of a comparison with a control condition. We consider
as potential control conditions all non-incentivised conditions from the BADS / BAAEC directories
that: (i) follow the same admission pathway (planned or emergency); (ii) have an RR ±15pp of the
incentivised condition to avoid differential ceiling effects 14; (iii) have SDD rates that are no more
than 30pp apart at the start of our sample period (Q2 2006); and (iv) have at least, on average,
300 admissions per quarter over the pre-policy period.
4.1 Difference-in-difference analysis
Our DID approach relies on selecting a single control condition that is not affected by the SDD
bonus policy but satisfies the parallel trends assumption that it responds similarly to the same
external influences, for each incentivised condition. If more than one potential control condition
satisfies these considerations, we select the one which minimises the difference in trends in the
proportion of SDDs prior to the introduction of the pricing policy (i.e. matching on pre-trends),
where pre-policy trends for each condition are estimated from separate linear regressions of Yˆjt on
a continuous measure of time as well as hospital and seasonal fixed effects.
For each incentivised condition, we then estimate the following DID model:
Yˆcjt = β0 + β1SDDc + γDt + τ(Dt × SDDc) + νcj + ϕct + ωcjt, (6)
where Yˆcjt is the risk-adjusted rate of SDD in hospital j in quarter t and for condition c ∈ [0, 1],
where 1 denotes the incentivised condition, ϕct is a vector of condition-specific seasonal effects
(spring, summer, autumn, winter), and νcj is a vector of condition-specific hospital fixed effects,
13Our analysis focuses on the intensive margin. Hospitals may also respond to the financial incentive by increasing the
volume of incentivised activity. However, we do not observe faster annual growths in volume of activity after the
introduction of the SDD bonus (pre: 6.5% vs. post: 2.3%, p = 0.264). Furthermore, the growth in non-incentivised
conditions over the 9 year period (mean = 13.3% per year) exceeds that of the incentivised conditions (mean = 5.4%).
Appendix Table A2 shows annual volumes of activity for the incentivised conditions.
14See also Allen et al. (2016). While it is possible mathematically for SDD rates to approach 100%, we expect the RR
to act as a natural ceiling that is unlikely to be breached.
14
which capture unobserved time-invariant differences amongst hospitals (e.g. management quality,
local demand) in the propensity to discharge patients on the same day as admission15.
The dummy variable SDDc takes the value of 1 if condition c is incentivised by the SDD bonus
and 0 otherwise and Dt is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 after the introduction of
the SDD bonus in t = t?, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest is τ , which denotes the
average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) over the post-policy period. ωcjt is an idiosyncratic
error term.
We also identify separate ATTs τk for each of the post-policy years k = 1 . . .K by replacing
the single dummy variable of Dt with a vector of dummy variables, each taking the value 1 for a
specific post-policy year k. These models thus allow for a delayed impact of the SDD policy which
may be because clinical processes take time to be reorganised. Alternatively, positive policy effects
may fade over time due to increasing marginal costs of further improvements.
All models are estimated as linear probability models with standard errors clustered at hospital
level.
4.2 Synthetic control analysis
The validity of our DID estimates may be compromised by two challenges. First, in our study, we
consider a large pool of potential control conditions, several of which may be suitable to model the
counterfactual outcome. The results of the DID analysis may be sensitive to the choice of control
condition, for example because of idiosyncratic shocks or measurement error in the control condition.
Second, while we select DID control conditions based on pre-policy trends, the assumption of
parallel trends applies to unobserved counterfactual outcomes and can therefore never be tested
Abadie et al. (2010). If the relationship between time-invariant unobservables and the outcome
changes over time, the parallel trend assumption is violated (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). The
SC method proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al.
(2015) can address both of these challenges. The method constructs a synthetic control condition as
a weighted combination of all potential control conditions, thus considering all relevant information
in predicting the counterfactual outcome and thereby lifting reliance on a specific control condition.
Furthermore, by matching on levels, the SC method provides reassurance that the synthetic control
15We allow for hospital fixed effects to vary between the intervention and the control condition to account for any
differences in a hospital’s relative propensity to discharge patients with different clinical conditions on the same day.
For example, a hospital may be 5pp more likely than the average hospital to discharge patients with the incentivised
condition on the same day and 12pp more likely to do so for patients with the control condition. In this case, forcing
a common hospital fixed effect for both groups would be inappropriate.
15
condition is well matched to the incentivised condition on time-invariant unobservables and that
both have similar scope for improvement (and, in this study, a similar risk of ceiling effects).
The SC method requires a panel data structure with the same units of observation being followed
over time. We aggregate the risk-adjusted hospital-quarter data to national SDD rates at the
level of condition-quarters based on hospitals’ quarterly volumes of patients. The pool of potential
control conditions is the same as for the DID analysis. Each potential control condition is assigned
a non-negative weight (which together sum to 1) according to a loss function that minimises the
discrepancy of the incentivised and SC conditions in terms of pre-policy SDD rates, expressed as the
root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE), and a set of average pre-policy patient characteristics
(see Section 3). The difference between observed and counterfactual outcomes provides an estimate
of the ATT and can be evaluated over different time periods to recover both τk and τ
16.
The SC method applies a different inference framework than standard econometric analysis,
which poses a challenge for comparative inference. As there is only a single observation per
condition and time point it is not possible to construct traditional standard errors. Instead, we
adopt the approach of placebo tests originally proposed by (Abadie et al. 2010). We estimate a set
of SC models, as described above, but treat each potential control condition in turn as if it was
the incentivised condition, with the incentivised condition added to the pool of potential control
conditions. In each iteration, we calculate the ratio of RMSPE in the pre- and post-intervention
periods. P-values are constructed as the proportion of RMPSE ratios that are at least as large as
that of the original model for the incentivised condition.17 We convert these placebo p-values to
standard errors through a normal approximation. The quality of this inference framework relies on
the number of potential control conditions; for example, with only 19 potential control conditions,
the smallest p-value that could be calculated is 11+19 = 0.05. Note that no standard errors can be
computed if p = 1.
All computations are performed using the user-written synth command in Stata 14.
16The estimated treatment effects are approximately unbiased under two key assumptions: a linear relationship between
the covariates and the outcome variable and a sufficiently long pre-policy time period relative to the variance of the
error term.
17Because the main estimate is also compared against itself, the numerator of this ratio is always ≥ 1 and the
denominator is V + 1, where V is the number of potential controls.
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5 Results
5.1 Model diagnostic and control group selection
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 32 incentivised conditions and corresponding control
conditions under the two methodologies. For each incentivised condition we calculate the pre-policy
trend (i.e. linear growth per quarter) in case-mix adjusted SDD rates as well as the same information
(expressed as deviations) for the control conditions, which serve as a diagnostic device of the parallel
trend assumption of the DID method. We also calculate (differences in) pre-policy levels, which are
informative about the level equivalence assumption of the SC method. Time-series graphs of SDD
rates for incentivised and control conditions are presented in the online appendix.
Our two selection approaches identify control conditions that are closely matched on pre-policy
trends with an average absolute deviation of 0.3pp per year for DID control conditions and 0.6pp per
year for SC control conditions (Columns 3 and 5). Only one DID control condition (#19 Chest pain)
shows a divergence in SDD rates of >1pp per year, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption
of the DID method are generally met in our analyses. In addition, the SC control conditions are
well matched in terms of levels (| ∆Level |) = 4pp) (Column 6) although this is traded off against
worse fit in terms of trends, with a larger number of conditions showing divergences of >1pp per
year.
Overall, for both methods and diagnostic statistics, the fit of the control condition is better
for planned care, where there is a large number of potential control conditions to choose from (16
to 85), than for emergency care (2 to 7). The small number of emergency control conditions also
limits the scope for inference after SC estimation. Only eleven out of 32 incentivised conditions
have a set of at least 20 potential control conditions necessary to generate p-values <0.05.
5.2 Policy effect on SDD rates
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of our DID and SC analysis. Figures 2 and 3 summarise the
main quantities of interest, the estimated ATT over the post-policy period (τ) and associated 95%
confidence intervals, in the form of forest plots. Results are presented for all 32 conditions, with
light grey, dashed confidence intervals flagging control conditions with trend divergence of >1pp
per year, i.e. where we deem the underlying identification assumptions to be less clearly met.
17
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(13) Tympanoplasty
(12) Septoplasty
(11) Tonsillectomy
(10) Fasciectomy
(9) Bunion treatment
(8) Therapeutic arthroscopy of shoulder
(7) Hernia repair
(6) Laser prostate resection
(5) Endoscoption prostate resection
(4) Female incontinence management
(3) Sentinal node mapping and resection
(2) Simple mastectomy
(1) Cholecystectomy
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
DID SC
Figure 2: Average change in SDD rate over post-policy - planned conditions
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(32) Abdominal pain
(31) Anaemia
(30) Bladder outflow obstruction
(29) Low risk pubic rami
(28) Minor head injury
(27) Arrhythmia
(26) Community acquired pneumonia
(25) Falls including syncope or collapse
(24) Deliberate self-harm
(23) Deep vein thrombosis
(22) Renal / ureteric stones
(21) Cellulitis
(20) Appendicular fractures not requiring internal fixation
(19) Chest pain
(18) Pulmonary embolism
(17) Lower respiratory tract infections without COPD
(16) Asthma
(15) Acute headache
(14) Epileptic seizure
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
DID SC
Figure 3: Average change in SDD rate over post-policy - emergency conditions
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Figure 4: Time trends for incentivised and control conditions - Sentinel node mapping and
resection
For the planned conditions, the results of DID analysis suggest that the policy led to a statistically
significant increase in SDD rates for 8 of the 13 incentivised conditions.18. The estimated policy
effects are heterogeneous in size, ranging from -1.6pp to 21.7pp, with three instances of more than
10pp. However, the results of the SC analysis call for a more conservative interpretation. Although
the point estimates under both methods are typically quite similar, the confidence intervals around
the SC estimates are substantially wider, even in instances where a large number of potential
control conditions exist. As a result, there is only planned condition (#3 Sentinal node mapping)
where a statistically significant increase in SDD rates can be ascribed to the policy. This is shown
as an example in Figure 4.
For emergency conditions, the DID analysis identifies statistically significant positive effects for
six conditions and negative effects for two conditions. The size of the effects is generally smaller
than those estimated for planned conditions, with no point estimate exceeding 6pp. Given the small
number of potential control conditions, the SC estimates are less reliable and deviate substantially
from the DID results. Moreover, the placebo tests cannot reject the possibility that these results
reflect chance variation, as evidenced by very wide confidence intervals.
The pooled effect across conditions according to our DID results are a 5.3pp increase in the
probability of SDD for planned patients, and a 1.4pp increase for emergency patients (Tables 3
18The number of incentivised conditions with statistically significant DID estimates reduces to 12 (five planned conditions
and 7 emergency conditions) after applying the Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. None of the SC
analyses yields statistically significant results.
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and 4), both of which are statistically significant at p<0.001.19 These DID results translate
into approximately 28,400 additional patients (95% CI: 23,297 to 33,502) admitted, treated and
discharged on the same day in a year across all incentivised conditions (Figure 5).20 Most of these
additional patients receive treatment for chest pain, where a small change in SDD rates applies to
a large patient population.
Figure 6 plots out the development of the policy effects for each of the 32 incentivised conditions
over time based on the DID model with interactions. The estimated developments are generally
non-linear, with some conditions experiencing an immediate response to the change in financial
incentives and subsequent flattening out, whereas others show a slow increase in SDD over time.
There is no single pattern to these developments with all possible permutations present.
5.3 Robustness checks
We conduct two robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations of our results which are
presented in Table 5. First, the introduction of incentives to increase SDD rates for some conditions
might lead to changes in SDD provision more broadly. These spillovers might be positive, for
example if clinicians apply their new skills to non-incentivised clinical conditions, or negative, for
example if increasing the provision of SDD care requires resources which might be in demand
for other patients, such as specialised day surgery beds. Spillover effects are most likely to occur
within the same clinical department, as departments are where hospital resources such as clinical
personal and beds are managed on a day-to-day basis. To test for spillovers, we re-estimate our
analyses excluding potential control conditions that are performed in the same clinical department
as the incentivised condition.21 We find our results to be substantively unchanged, suggesting that
spillovers are unlikely to drive our main estimates.
Second, for planned conditions, hospitals only receive the higher SDD price if they both schedule
and provide SDD care. Hospitals that are already achieving high SDD rates prior to the policy
but record poorly whether they have scheduled that care in advance to be delivered on the same
day, may therefore be able to increase their payment simply by better recording scheduling plans.
If so, observed changes in the incentivised outcome may not reflect changes in patient care but
19The overall effects are calculated as weighted averages, where the weights (wm) are given by the size of the patient
population for each incentivised condition m = 1 . . .M divided by the size of the patient population overall. The
corresponding standard errors are calculated as
√∑M
m SE
2
m × w2m.
20The additional patients treated as SDD across all incentivised conditions in a given year is
∑32
cm=1 τN¯cm
∑32
m=1 τN¯m
where N¯m is the number of patients within the scope of each incentivised condition m in the average post-policy year.
21All emergency conditions are considered to be part of the same specialty of Emergency Medicine.
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+4086 ***
+868 **
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+588 ***
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+418 ***
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+15073 ***
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+2016 ***
+1240 ***
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-3243 ***
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+85
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-137 *
-4
+586 ***
-1683
Cholecystectomy
Simple mastectomy
Sentinel node mapping and resection
Operations to manage female incontinence
Endoscopic prostate resection
Laser prostate resection
Hernia repair
Therapeutic arthroscopy of shoulder
Bunion operations
Fasciectomy
Tonsillectomy
Septoplasty
Tympanoplasty
Epileptic seizure
Acute headache
Asthma
Lower respiratory tract infections without COPD
Pulmonary embolism
Chest pain
Appendicular fractures not
requiring immediate internal fixation
Cellulitis
Renal / ureteric stones
Deep vein thrombosis
Deliberate self-harm
Falls including syncope or collapse
Community acquired pneumonia
Arrhythmia
Minor head injury
Low risk pubic rami
Bladder outflow obstruction
Anaemia
Abdominal pain
-5000 0 5000 1000015000
Number of additional patients
Figure 5: Additional SDD patients per year based on ITS estimates
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just coding practice. We therefore also estimate models where the dependent variable is a simple
indicator of SDD (i.e. LoS=0), independent of scheduling. Our findings are broadly similar
across DID analyses. In general, policy effects on LoS=0 rates are larger than those based on
meeting the exact conditions for the SDD bonus, suggesting our main analysis is conservative in
measuring the impact of the policy on patient care, as hospitals did not always plan or report
the planning of SDD despite carrying it out. Exceptions to this general finding are conditions
#1 Cholecystectomy, #11 Tonsilectomy and #12 Septoplasty, where effects on LoS=0 are smaller
but still positive. Furthermore, for conditions #6 Laser prostate resection and #8 Therapeutic
arthroscopy of shoulder our LoS=0 estimates indicate large negative effects of the policy which are
also significant. Comparisons of SC analyses indicate generally similar magnitudes of policy effects.
5.4 Association with incentive design features
Thus far, our results have demonstrated that the response to the SDD bonus policy varies substan-
tially across incentivised conditions. We now investigate if this variation is associated with features
of the design of SDD incentives. Since the 32 conditions incentivised by the policy vary in the size
of the price differential PSDD1 − PON1 relative to the base price PON1 , we compute the elasticities of
the policy response with respect to price changes as
 =
τ/Y¯Pre
(PSDD1 − PON1 )/PON1
(7)
where Y¯Pre is the observed outcome for the incentivised condition in the year before the
announcement period. Focussing on the DID estimates, we find a median elasticity of 0.24 across
the 13 planned conditions, and 0.01 across the 19 emergency conditions. Five conditions show an
elasticity above 1.
As there are just 32 conditions, it is not possible to conduct multivariate regression analysis of
incentive design features that may affect the elasticity of the policy response. We therefore resort to
univariate correlation analyses which are presented in the form of scatter plots in Figure 7. Hospitals
may respond more strongly for conditions offering relatively higher financial returns. Figures 7a
and 7b plot the elasticities as a function of the post-policy SDD price PSDD1 and as a function of
the price difference PSDD1 − PON1 . Figure 7c shows the association between the policy response
and the total incentive, capturing both price and cost differences between SDD and ON, the latter
being approximated by information on average costs in the year prior to the policy introduction.
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We find suggestive evidence that larger elasticities are concentrated in conditions with higher SDD
prices, but not with larger price differences. Moreover, elasticities appear to increase in the size of
the total incentive ∆(P −AC) = (PSDD1 −ACSDD0 )− (PON1 −ACON0 ) but only for planned SDD
conditions.
We also explore whether responses appear to be driven by clinical reasons. We hypothesise that
responses to the SDD bonus are more pronounced if SDD pre-policy rates are lower and the gap to
the RR is higher, therefore giving more scope for improvement. Figure 7d provides some support
that larger elasticities occur for planned conditions with lower pre-policy SDD rates. However,
somewhat counterintuitively, Figure 7e suggests a negative relationship between the elasticities and
the gap between existing practice (i.e. pre-policy SDD rate) for planned SDD care. One potential
mechanism for this finding is that the size of gap between existing practice and recommended rate
is larger when the costs or other limitations to higher SDD rates discussed above are larger. In such
cases, the additional incentive created by the policy may still be insufficient for a larger number of
hospitals, reflected in a lower national response.
6 Conclusions
We have assessed the long-term impact of a generous pricing policy designed to encourage hospitals
to treat patients as a ‘same day discharge’, involving admission, treatment and discharge on the
same calendar day. Despite being considered clinically appropriate and having lower costs, English
policy makers have been frustrated by the low rates of SDD for many conditions. Consequently, in
order to encourage behavioural change by doctors and hospitals, policy makers have set prices for
SDD that are well above average costs and are also higher than the price for patients allocated to
the same DRG who have an overnight stay.
Economic theory predicts that a significant price differential would result in greater provision of
treatment on an SDD basis. An early study into the policy impact for one condition, cholecystectomy,
suggested that the SDD pricing policy met short-term policy objectives (Allen et al. 2016). Since
this study, the policy has been rolled out to 31 more conditions. Our study set out to assess how far
these earlier findings would be generalisable to these other conditions, whether short-term impacts
would hold over the longer-term and what design features of the policy might explain the magnitude
of any response. Based on the results of our DID analysis, we find a positive policy response for 14
of the 32 incentivised conditions, translating into approximately 28,400 more patients treated on an
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Figure 7: Association between price elasticity of SDD care and incentive design factors
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SDD basis per year. However, perhaps surprisingly, we do not find a consistent positive response
across all incentivised conditions. Indeed, for two conditions the response is negative: despite the
enhanced price advantage, fewer SDD treatments are provided post-policy than predicted. For
others there is no apparent response. Nor are we able to identify any general temporal pattern in
the policy response, with both rapid and delayed uptake of SDD practices being observed. These
mixed results mirror those of the literature on P4P, which provides inconclusive evidence for the
effectiveness of using financial incentives to drive quality (Milstein and Schreyo¨gg 2016).
This lack of generalisability cautions against drawing firm conclusions from a single analysis.
Indeed, cholecystectomy turns out to be the condition exhibiting the second greatest positive
response among the 32 conditions. Moreover, while Milstein and Schreyo¨gg (2016) suggested that
P4P arrangements are most appropriate for emergency care, where hospitals have less opportunity
to select patients, we find that the SDD pricing policy was more effective for planned care (median
elasticity = 0.24) than emergency care (median = 0.01). This may be because clinicians may have
ethical concerns about discharging patients in urgent need of care without a period of observation,
whereas such concerns are less prominent when care is scheduled in advance. Also, emergency
admissions occur at unpredictable points in the day, making it difficult to achieve SDD for some
patients; particularly those admitted late in the evening. This may limit the scope for rapid
increases in SDD rates in emergency conditions compared to planned conditions.
It has been argued that the limited impact of P4P schemes is due to incentives being too
small (Milstein and Schreyo¨gg 2016). In this study, for all conditions, the price incentive was more
high-powered than that typically associated with P4P schemes. But there was significant variation
across the conditions in terms of the relative size of the incentive, and we exploit this to investigate
the association of incentive size and the estimated clinical response across 32 conditions. There is
suggestive evidence that the response to the incentive was greater for conditions with higher SDD
prices post policy and with lower SDD rates pre policy. There does not appear to be an association
between the size of the price differential, i.e. the marginal reimbursement that hospitals attract
from adopting SDD care, and the size of the response. However, there is a positive association,
especially for planned conditions, when both price and cost advantages of SDD care are taken into
consideration.
On the methodological side, our study highlights an important shortcoming of the SC method
compared to more traditional DID analysis in a policy evaluation context commonly encountered by
applied health economists. Because the SC method aims to make inference about a treatment based
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on a single treated unit followed over time, the scope for statistical inference is limited to placebo
tests. The quality of inference is thus dependent on the number of potential control conditions
over which these placebo tests can be conducted. Even for planned SDD conditions, where there
are as many as 85 potential control conditions, we only found one statistically significant result at
the usual 5% critical level; compared to eight in DID analysis. This is not due to fundamentally
different findings about the effectiveness of the SDD pricing policy, as point estimates were generally
similar for both methods. The literature on statistical inference techniques for SC methods is
rapidly evolving but has not yet reached a consensus on statistical testing (Firpo and Possebom
2018; Hahn and Shi 2017). Until then, analysts should remain cautious about drawing conclusions
about policy interventions based on traditional inference thresholds, or interpret SC results as
robustness checks for more traditional causal inference methods such as DID.
There are two important limitations to our study that should be addressed by future research.
First, while we do not find evidence of spillovers from incentivised to non-incentivised SDD
conditions, we cannot rule out that spillovers among the 32 incentivised conditions contribute
to the limited overall policy effect that we observe. For example, hospitals may find it difficult
to increase SDD rates for a condition that starts to be incentivised if dedicated inputs (e.g. day
beds on specialised wards) are limited and have already been allocated to another condition where
the incentive has been in place for longer. Our analysis treats all 32 incentivised conditions as
independent and therefore cannot detect such spillovers. To address this, future research would need
to develop a more complex model of inter-hospital allocation of resources that also incorporates the
changes in incentive structure over time, which goes beyond the scope of the current paper. Second,
our analysis focusses on changes in discharge behaviour and does not analyse effects on patients’
health outcomes. The assumed welfare effects of the SDD policy are predicated upon the clinical
consensus and existing evidence (e.g. Gilliard et al. (2006), Marla and Stallard (2009), Vaughan
et al. (2013), and NICE (2014)) that SDD care is as safe and effective as care involving overnight
stays. Future research should seek to confirm this assumption.
In conclusion, we find some evidence that hospitals respond to price signals and that payers,
therefore, can use pricing instruments to improve technical efficiency. However, there appears to be
substantial variation in hospitals’ reactions even among similar types of financial incentives that is
not explained by the size of the financial incentive or the clinical setting in which it is applied. It
has been said that a randomised controlled trial demonstrates only that something works for one
group of patients in one particular context but may not be generalisable (Rothwell 2005). Similarly,
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a pricing policy that appears to work as intended in one area may not be effective when applied
elsewhere, hence the need for continued experimentation and evaluation.
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7 Appendix
Table A1: Means of patient characteristics
# BPT Age Male
Deprivation
score
Elixhauser
score
Past emergency
admission
1 Cholecystectomy 49.9 0.22 0.16 0.97 0.43
2 Simple mastectomy 50.9 0.17 0.13 0.54 0.09
3 Sentinel node mapping and resection 59.0 0.10 0.13 0.99 0.08
4 Operations to manage female incontinence 53.3 0.00 0.14 0.73 0.07
5 Endoscopic prostate resection 72.1 1.00 0.13 1.78 0.38
6 Laser prostate resection 71.4 1.00 0.13 1.56 0.37
7 Hernia repair 58.3 0.85 0.14 0.86 0.11
8 Therapeutic arthroscopy of shoulder 56.1 0.50 0.14 0.95 0.07
9 Bunion operation 56.4 0.16 0.14 0.72 0.05
10 Fasciectomy 64.6 0.78 0.13 0.81 0.06
11 Tonsillectomy 32.0 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.17
12 Septoplasty 41.2 0.69 0.15 0.42 0.06
13 Tympanoplasty 42.4 0.50 0.16 0.15 0.06
14 Epileptic seizure 53.5 0.54 0.18 3.57 0.59
15 Acute headache 45.9 0.35 0.17 1.22 0.30
16 Asthma 47.1 0.30 0.19 2.55 0.40
17 Lower respiratory tract infections without COPD 51.7 0.44 0.17 0.70 0.26
18 Pulmonary embolism 62.3 0.47 0.14 3.03 0.36
19 Chest pain 59.3 0.53 0.17 2.22 0.37
20 Appendicular fractures not requiring fixation 63.4 0.41 0.16 1.61 0.26
21 Cellulitis 57.0 0.56 0.16 1.66 0.31
22 Renal/ureteric stones 45.8 0.69 0.17 0.74 0.27
23 Deep vein thrombosis 61.8 0.50 0.16 2.03 0.43
24 Deliberate self-harm 39.1 0.43 0.20 2.19 0.44
25 Falls including syncope or collapse 67.6 0.52 0.16 2.46 0.37
26 Community acquired pneumonia 51.8 0.50 0.16 0.63 0.22
27 Arrhythmia 68.1 0.48 0.14 3.42 0.39
28 Minor head injury 54.9 0.56 0.18 1.63 0.33
29 Low risk pubic rami 81.3 0.15 0.14 2.43 0.37
30 Bladder outflow obstruction 68.5 0.81 0.15 2.15 0.39
31 Anemia 69.7 0.36 0.17 3.94 0.38
32 Abdominal pain 47.7 0.35 0.17 1.51 0.39
Notes: See Section 3 for variable definitions.
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